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A 2010 UPDATE: WHAT EVERY ENTERTAINMENT LAWYER NEEDS TO 
    KNOW—HOW TO AVOID BEING THE TARGET OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE   
                                       CLAIM OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION    
  
 
                  JACK P. SAHL
1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is significant risk today that lawyers will become the target of a disciplinary 
or legal malpractice action, especially given the complexity of the law and advances in 
technology that reduce the amount of time that lawyers have to reflect about client 
matters.
2
  This risk is heightened by the increased competition in the bar to deliver legal 
services in a cost-effective manner, the sophistication of clients who expect competent, 
efficient and reasonably priced services, and the litigious nature of consumers.
3
  The risk 
is further exacerbated by the ever-changing methods and rules for electronic 
                                                 
1
  Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Miller-Becker Center for Professional Responsibility at the 
University of Akron School of Law.  I would like to thank my research assistants, Tracy Signet and Shane 
McCammon, who assisted me in researching and writing this article, and Danielle Moskos, Brenna Fasko, 
William Shelly and Mike Rasor, who helped with annual revisions.   
2
 Kenneth J. Abdo and Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics: Part 1, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 2 (2004). 
See generally Ameet Sachdev, Total Attorneys: Chicago-Based Firm Under Fire, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 13, 
2009, at Business Section, 1 (reporting that Connecticut is investigating for possible violation of its 
advertising rules a legal information Web site, TotalBankruptcy.com, that provides certain lawyers the 
exclusive rights to contact consumers generated by the site in return for lawyers paying $65 per contact).  
3
 Id.  Consumers may be more litigious concerning certain types of legal or business services.  See 
Stewards of James Brown Estate Sue Morgan Stanley, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at C3 (discussing a 
dispute over the estate of the legendary soul singer, James Brown, and stating ―it is not atypical for estate 
lawyers or court-appointed trustees to sue former business managers, [although] it is unusual for them to 
sue the banks that managed the accounts overseen by the former business managers . . . .‖).  See also 
Washington v. Escobar No. 103027/09, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2596, 242 N.Y.L.J. 46 (2009) 
(concerning, in part, a common dispute in the entertainment industry where talent refused to pay for the 
services of a personal manager claiming that he acted as an employment agency in violation of the state‘s 
―theatrical employment agency‖ statute).   The statute involved in Escobar,  N.Y. Gen. Bus Law Section 
171§(8), was held to apply to a booking agent who secured lectures and other engagements for a prominent 
theatrical and motion picture industry personality in Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc. 90 Misc.2d 680, 395 
N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).   Cf. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App.4th 1465, 84 Cal Rptr.2d 616 
(1999) (voiding a contact under the California Labor Code between a band and a personal manager because 
he secured performance engagements without being licensed as a talent agency).  See generally Stan 
Soocher, ‗Unlicensed Agent’ Won’t Stop Suit By Manager, 25 ENT. L. & FIN.  5 (Oct. 2009) (discussing 
Washington v. Escobar). 
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communication and the storage of information.
4
  The magnitude of the risk is 
underscored by the prediction that law school graduates ―will be the subject of three or 
more claims of legal malpractice before finishing a career.‖5  
This article examines some good practice standards that minimize the risk that a 
lawyer will become the target of a legal malpractice or disciplinary action.  These 
standards should also reduce the risk of a lawyer becoming the object of a 
disqualification or Rule 11 motion.
6
  This article discusses these standards in the 
entertainment law context but they also apply to a variety of practice areas.      
                                                 
4
 Experts have noted the new landscape concerning electronic communication and the storage of 
information.  George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007).   For example,  
 
There has been a civilization-wide morph, or pulse, or one might say that information has 
evolved.  But quite recently there has been an evolutionary burst in writing technology–a 
jagged punctuation on a 50 century-long sine wave.  A quick succession of advances 
clustered or synced together, to emerge into a radically new and more powerful writing 
technology.  These include digitization; real time computing; the microprocessor; the 
personal computer; e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading to the Internet; the 
evolution of software, which has ―locked in‖ seamless editing as an almost universal 
function; the World Wide Web; and of course people and their technique.   These 
constituents have swirled into an information complex, now known as the ―Information 
Ecosystem.‖ 
  Id. at  1, 5-7.  
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which is generally considered the 
first definitive case dealing with the wide range of electronic discovery issues in litigation.  In this case, the 
court held that a plaintiff was entitled to discover all relevant emails which had been deleted and were now 
only on back up disks on the defendant‘s computers.   
5
 JEFFREY M. SMITH & RONALD E. MALLEN, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE x (1989) [hereinafter 
SMITH & MALLEN].  
6
 Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 4th 846, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 591 (2006) provides an 
example of a successful disqualification motion in an entertainment related case, albeit in an unusual 
setting involving a prosecutor and her office.  In Haraguchi, the court upheld the disqualification of a Santa 
Barbara County district attorney from working on a rape by intoxication case because of her entertainment 
activities.  The district attorney had self-published a novel, ―Intoxicating Agent,‖ that concerned rape by 
intoxication which she was promoting while prosecuting an identical charge against the petitioner-
defendant.  The court found ―sufficient factual similarities between the novel and the petitioner-defendant‘s 
case to suggest that the district attorney [relied] on petitioner‘s case for plot lines.‖  Id. at 854, 49 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 596.  The court noted that ―[n]o current public employee should be permitted to exploit his or her 
official position as a lever to earn extra private income where such will inure to the detriment of the 
employer.‖  Id.  The court found a disabling conflict of interest in Haraguchi because, in part, there is a 
―reasonable possibility that the [district attorney] may not exercise her discretionary functions in an 
evenhanded manner.‖ Id. at 855, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597.  Her interest in seeing ―her book succeed will 
trump her duty as a prosecutor to see that justice is done and to accord to defendants their constitutional 
rights.‖  Id.    
  3 
 
A. SCREENING THE CASE AND CLIENT 
One of the most important and difficult decisions an entertainment lawyer makes 
is the decision to represent a particular client.
7
  Client representation may subject the 
lawyer to a variety of risks, for example, third-party lawsuits for tortious interference 
with contract,
8
 tortious interference with prospective economic advantage,
9
 defamation,
10
 
                                                 
7
 See David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice and the Eternal Triangle: Will 
Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 373 n.89 (1997/1998) (quoting Robert E. 
O‘Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 325, 361 (1989) for the 
proposition that ―[s]ome of the worst claims in the history of the legal profession are directly attributable to 
the bad judgment of an individual partner in accepting a new client‖).   
8
 Source Entertainment Group, LLC v. Baldonado & Associates, P.C., No. 06-2706, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 
1580157, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209 (D.N.J. 2007).  Source Entertainment, a management and 
entertainment company, signed a management agreement with a minor, Tiffany Evans.  Id. at 1.  The 
management agreement was subsequently approved by a New Jersey Superior Court.  Source obtained a 
record deal with Sony Music, agency representation with William Morris, and a steady stream of acting 
jobs and singing performances.  Id. at 2.  Evans allegedly became unhappy with Source and contracted with 
Baldonado & Associates (Baldonado), the defendant law firm, to represent Evans in all aspects of her 
entertainment career.  Id.  Baldonado sent a letter to Source purportedly terminating its management 
contract with Evans.  Id.  The district court dismissed Baldonado‘s motion for a judgment on the pleadings 
and ruled that at this stage Source had stated a valid claim for tortious interference of existing contractual 
relations, tortious interference with existing and prospective economic advantage, and defamation.  Id. at 8.  
In New Jersey, a tortious interference with contract claim requires the plaintiff to show ―(1) it was a party 
to an existing contractual relationship; (2) the defendant intentionally interfered with that contractual 
relationship; (3) the interference was undertaken with malice; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages resulting 
from the interference.‖ Id. at 4.  See Tortious-Interference Claims, 23, No. 5 ENT. L. & FIN. 7 (Aug. 2007) 
(briefly explaining the holding in Source). 
9
 Source Entertainment, No. 06-2706, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1580157, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209 (D.N.J. 
2007).  For a ―tortious interference with existing and prospective economic advantage‖ claim, the plaintiff 
must prove ―(1) it had a continuing or prospective economic relationship or reasonable expectation of 
economic advantage; (2) the defendant knew of the contract or relationship of expectance; (3) the 
interference was done intentionally or without justification or excuse; (4) it is reasonably probable that the 
plaintiff‘s loss was a result of defendant‘s interference and (5) damages resulted from the interference.‖  Id. 
at 6.  
10
 Source Entertainment, No. 06-2706, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1580157, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209 
(D.N.J. 2007).   In Source, the defendant law firm sent a letter purportedly terminating Source‘s 
management contract with the artist, Tiffany Evans, to third parties, such as Sony Records and the William 
Morris Agency.  The district court permitted the plaintiff to proceed with its defamation claim and noted 
that defendant‘s letter stated that Source ―continually mistreated Tiffany.‖ Id. at 7.  The district court also 
rejected the defendants‘ arguments that they were immune from liability under the so-called ―litigation 
privilege‖ because they were attempting to protect Tiffany‘s right to disaffirm the management contract.  
Id.  ―Under the litigation privilege, an attorney is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matters 
concerning another so long as the communication was ―‗(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; 
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) 
have some connection or logical relation to the action.‘‖  Id. (citing Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 
(1995) (quoting Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 460 (Law Div. 1977)).  The district court held that 
  4 
and Rule 11 sanctions.
11
  Lawyers nevertheless often expose themselves to the risks 
associated with client representation by accepting employment based on inadequate 
information about the client and his or her effect on the firm‘s practice.12 
 There are several considerations and steps at the intake stage of the lawyer-client 
relationship that can provide lawyers with more information about the risks associated 
with accepting specific employment.
13
  This information and an understanding of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the defendants‘ defamatory statements were not made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.  Although 
New Jersey law does not limit the litigation privilege to courtroom statements, none of the other contexts in 
which the litigation privilege attaches, such as statements made during settlement negotiations and private 
conferences with an attorney regarding litigation, were applicable.  Id. at 7. 
11
 See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, Slip Copy, No. 4:06-CV-132-4, 2007 WL 1435395 (N.D. Tex. 
2007).  The plaintiffs, recording companies that own or control copyrighted sound recordings, sued Diane 
Heslep for copyright infringement by peer-to-peer file sharing.  Id. at 3.  Heslep argued that the plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys should be sanctioned under Rule 11 because Heslep ―established that she was at work at the exact 
date [January 6, 2005] and time the amended complaint alleges she was online infringing Plaintiffs‘ 
copyrights, that AOL has confirmed that she was not herself online at the specific date and time in 
question, and that AOL could not identify the specific computer in use at the date and time in question.‖  
Id. at 5.  The district court found evidence that suggested that Heslep‘s assertions were disingenuous and it 
noted that Heslep did not deny infringing on the plaintiffs‘ copyrights ―‗on other occasions on or before 
January 6, 2005.‘‖  Id. at 4, 6.  The court ruled that the plaintiffs‘ attorneys acted reasonably in attempting 
to resolve the dispute with Heslep and that their conduct did not merit sanctioning.  Id. at 6.  However, the 
court sanctioned Heslep‘s lawyer under Rule 11 because she filed a frivolous Rule 11 motion against the 
plaintiffs‘ lawyers for the purpose of harassment.  The frivolous motion also unnecessarily increased 
litigation costs.  Id. at 8.  See also Downloading Suits/Rule 11 Sanctions, No. 4, 23 ENT. L. & FIN. 7 (July 
2007) (briefly discussing the holding in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, Slip Copy, No. 4:06-CV-132-
4, 2007 WL 1435395, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35824 (N.D. Tex. 2007)). 
12
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 83.  (―A significant cause of claims against attorneys is the 
acceptance of new matters, whether from new, current or former clients, without sufficient analysis of the 
clients and the transactions.‖)  One of the risks confronting lawyers is that they may be criticized because  
of the type of clients they represent or their clients‘ conduct.  For example, the music industry in piracy 
cases was portrayed in the media as the ―heavy‖ for prosecuting teenage offenders.  See Samantha Chang, 
Legal Matters: Piracy Showdown Likely in High Court, BILLBOARD, Oct. 12, 2003 (quoting entertainment 
lawyer and associate professor Stan Soocher).  The entertainment lawyers who represented the music 
industry risked being viewed in a similar light. Another significant risk is that the client will not pay the 
lawyer‘s fee.  See e.g., Musburger v. Meier, 1-07-3838, 914 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  In 
Musburger, the lawyer represented a radio personality who agreed to pay attorney fees and expenses and 
five percent of the gross amount of the contracts that he negotiated for Meier.  Id. at 1201-02.  In affirming 
a jury award of $68,750, the court held that an attorney who is representing a client on a contingent fee 
basis is entitled to quantum meruit recovery when discharged.  Id. at 1209; Stan Soocher, Radio Personality 
Must Pay for Lawyer’s Services, ENT. LAW & FIN. 1,3, (Oct. 2009).   
13
 See SMITH & MALLEN supra note 5, § 2.7, at 87-88.  
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profession‘s ethics rules will help lawyers to avoid becoming the target of a malpractice 
or disciplinary action.
14
   
 The first step for minimizing the likelihood of a malpractice or disciplinary action 
is for the lawyer to conduct the initial client interview in a manner that elicits a good 
understanding of the client‘s concerns and objectives.15  As the professional, the lawyer 
bears significant responsibility for effectively communicating with the client given the 
lawyer‘s training, knowledge, and authority to act on behalf of the client.  The balance of 
power in the initial lawyer-client interview is often skewed heavily in favor of the lawyer, 
so it is incumbent upon him or her to be sensitive, resourceful, and professional during 
the interview to gain not only important information but also the client‘s confidence.  The 
lawyer‘s use of non-leading and open-ended questions and the encouragement of client 
narratives about his or her situation are often effective approaches for promoting full 
disclosure and understanding.
16
  The lawyer‘s use of leading questions and follow-up 
                                                 
14
 This article primarily cites provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 
adopted in 1983 by the ABA House of Delegates.  The Model Rules have been amended over the years and 
were substantially modified in August 2001, and February and August 2002 ―as a result of changes 
proposed by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, popularly called 
‗Ethics, 2000.‘‖  See MORGAN AND ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2008).   Some version of the Model Rules is followed by almost every state, although 
some states have retained concepts found in the predecessor code, the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility (Code) adopted in 1969.  See MORGAN AND ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 12-13 (2006).  
15
 It is important that the lawyer attempt to avoid interruptions during the interview, demonstrate an interest 
in the client‘s story, and, where appropriate, express support for the client‘s predicament.  This should build 
trust and rapport with the client.  During the interview, the lawyer should also note important facts or 
questions in writing and apprise the client that subsequent communications or interviews may be necessary 
before undertaking representation.  See NOELLE C. NELSON, CONNECTING WITH YOUR CLIENT xi, 2 (1996) 
(discussing communication techniques at the initial interview stage and emphasizing that ―[t]he key to 
delivering legal services in a way that ensures client cooperation and satisfaction is communication‖) 
[hereinafter NELSON].  
16
 Id. at 32-33 (recommending ―[o]pen-ended questions [that] allow clients to talk about their problems or 
concerns from their point view‖).   
  6 
comments should help the lawyer shape the direction of the interview and facilitate 
greater disclosure.
17
   
Determining the client‘s objectives is particularly important for the entertainment 
lawyer who also may be working as an agent or manager while practicing law.
18
  For 
example, an artist may want a lawyer to provide legal representation on a contingent fee 
basis while also managing the artist‘s personal affairs.19  Because the roles of a manager 
and a lawyer can differ, the lawyer should ascertain the precise nature and scope of 
services the client wishes the lawyer to perform to preclude any confusion.
20
 
 Second, the lawyer should ascertain the client‘s reasons for seeking the lawyer‘s 
services.
21
  The client‘s reasons may range from reports about the firm‘s strong reputation 
for good work to its reasonable fee structure and policy regarding the advancement of 
litigation-related expenses.
22
  Educating the client about the firm‘s policies is especially 
critical at the intake stage because it diminishes the likelihood that the client may feel 
                                                 
17
 Id. at 35 (reporting that once the lawyer has established a rapport with the client ―by asking open-ended 
questions and appreciating the answers,‖ the lawyer should ―move on to narrowly focused questions to get 
the specific answers you need‖).   
18
 See Kenneth J. Abdo and Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics Part 2: Agents, Managers and 
Lawyers, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 2, 4 (2005). Kenneth J. Abdo, Shopping Record Deals for Lawyers: 
A&R Approach and Ethics Issues, 23 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4-5 (2005).   
19
 Id.  The fiduciary duty of non-lawyer managers may be more circumscribed than that of lawyer-
managers who understand contractual terms.  See Reznor v. J. Artist Mgmt., 365 F. Supp. 2d 565, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6805 (S.D.N.Y. 20005) (dismissing Nine Inch Nails lead singer Trent Reznor‘s motion 
for summary judgment).  In the motion, Reznor claimed that his manager had breached his fiduciary duty, 
but the court held that that a jury could find that, because his manager was not a lawyer, ―he did not 
understand‖ the terms now at issue and he thus ―fulfilled whatever duty he owed Reznor by disclosing all 
the material terms and facts of which he was aware.‖  Id. at 575, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6805 at 23-24 
(S.D.N.Y. 20005).  See also Recent Cases, NO. 4, 27 ENT. L. RPTR. 7 (2005) (reporting that the court also 
dismissed Reznor‘s claim that the management contract was unconscionable). 
20
 See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that managers negotiate contracts, provide business 
assistance, and often ―nurture the artist‘s career,‖ while lawyers shop talent and creative material, provide 
financial advice, and protect the client‘s interests under the governance of applicable ethical guidelines).  
See generally Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, CA. CODE ANN. §340.6, as recognized in Laird v. Blacker, 279 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1991) 
(deciding one of the more egregious cases involving a lawyer who performed multiple roles, including 
serving as the business manager and financial advisor, for a client—in this case, the actress, Doris Day)).    
21
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 87. 
22
 Id.  
  7 
deceived or betrayed about the basis for employment.  The lawyer should correct any 
misconceptions about the firm—for example, that a particular lawyer will staff the case 
or that the firm‘s relationship with another party, such as a film or record company, will 
produce success.   
 Lawyers also should consider the intake stage a valuable opportunity to assess the 
effectiveness of their marketing efforts.  For example, a client may inform the lawyer that 
the firm‘s advertising prompted the client‘s visit.  If the lawyer learns that the client was 
referred to the firm, the firm should thank the referring party.
23
   
 Third, effective client screening at the intake stage involves some assessment of 
the client‘s character traits.24  Lawyers may not want to represent difficult clients. 
Difficult clients may be those who: (1) unduly criticize lawyers and the legal system; (2) 
insist on ethically questionable strategies;
25
 (3) possess unrealistic expectations about the 
success or value of a controversy;
26
 and (4) have terminated former counsel.
27
  Lawyers 
should learn the circumstances surrounding the termination or withdrawal of former 
counsel in hope of avoiding a similar fate. 
                                                 
23
 See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that ―[m]any entertainment lawyers rely on referrals for 
their services from . . . previous clients, lawyers, agents, managers and personnel with entertainment 
companies‖ and cautioning lawyers not to provide compensation of any kind for the referral). 
24
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 89. 
25
 Id.  A good example of clients requesting lawyers to pursue a questionable ethical strategy involves an 
artist pressuring the lawyer who is negotiating a deal on his behalf to exaggerate the interest by competitors 
in acquiring the artist-client‘s services in hope of starting a bidding war for the artist-client‘s services.   
Lawyers need to inform clients that although some commercial puffery is generally permitted, lawyers can 
not make any misrepresentations during the deal negotiations.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
4.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly ―mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person) and (b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly ―fail[ing] to disclose a material fact to a third person 
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is 
prohibited by rule 1.6). 
26
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE LAWYER‘S DESK GUIDE TO 
PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 56 (1999) [ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY]. 
27
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 89.   
  8 
 On the other hand, the client‘s willingness to honestly communicate and listen to 
the lawyer and consider his or her advice are important traits favoring the lawyer‘s 
acceptance of employment.
28
  Clients need to understand that effective communication is 
a two-way street and that the client bears some of the responsibility for ensuring good 
communication.  A client should apprise the lawyer of any material changes in the 
client‘s personal and professional life that may affect the representation—ranging from 
the client‘s change of address to his or her discovery of relevant information or evidence.  
The lawyer also should note any questions the lawyer has about the client‘s personality 
that pose a risk to the firm and that warrant additional investigation.
29
 
 Fourth, the lawyer should consider the client‘s financial background to determine 
the sources and level of financial support for the representation.  Information concerning 
a client‘s outstanding and potential debts as well as a list of the entertainment client‘s 
assets may help the lawyer understand possible financial constraints to the 
representation.
30
   
 Fifth, the lawyer should investigate whether the firm can competently represent 
the client.
31
  The firm may have to expend resources to develop or enhance its 
competency before undertaking representation—including the hiring of experienced 
lawyers or support staff, or attending a continuing education program in the field.
32
  Even 
after representation has begun, the law firm may need to enhance its competency.  For 
                                                 
28
 Id. § 2.7, at 88.  See NELSON, supra note 15, at 78-82.  Honest and full communication with the lawyer is 
promoted by educating the client about the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and the lawyer‘s ethical 
obligation to protect information relating to representation.  It is important that the lawyer discuss these 
concepts and their limitations with the client as soon as possible.  
29
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 88.  
30
 See id.  See also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that lawyers often represent entertainment 
clients on a contingency fee basis because of their clients‘ limited financial resources). 
31
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 88.  
32
 Abdo and Sahl, supra note 2, at 3.  Lawyers should attend continuing legal education programs in the 
entertainment field to help ensure they provide competent representation.  Id. 
  9 
example, the law firms representing the music industry in the well-known copyright 
infringement case, MGA Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
33
 added a team of partners and several 
associates—including the hiring of former United States Solicitor General Ken Starr as 
co-counsel—once the parties decided to seek Supreme Court review.34   
Sixth, the lawyer needs to consider what, if any, possible ethical or business 
conflicts of interest might arise that could cause a loss of business to the firm.
35
   This 
consideration militates against a lawyer hastily accepting a new client or matter without 
adequate time to reflect upon possible conflicts, especially in the context of a large firm 
where the lawyer may need to consult with several colleagues.  The consultation may 
take several days and require the lawyer to send a firm-wide memo identifying the 
proposed employment.   
Lawyers should inform clients that their professional code of ethics may preclude 
them from accepting employment where a conflict of interest exists in certain 
circumstances.  This approach provides two benefits to lawyers: it gives the lawyer time 
to step back and reflect upon whether the lawyer should accept employment, and also 
underscores to the layperson that the lawyer‘s professional services are governed by a 
code of professional norms.  
Finally, entertainment lawyers must remember that accepting client representation 
may be dangerous to their professional well-being.  Refusing an offer of employment 
may represent the best business and personal decision that a lawyer makes all year.  Even 
                                                 
33
 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
34
 Susan Butler, Legal Matters: Supreme Team, BILLBOARD, July 9, 2005.  
35
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 88.  For example, a lawyer who defends a record company 
regarding employment matters may not be precluded ethically from representing a plaintiff in a wrongful 
termination of employment action against another record company.  However, as a business matter, the 
lawyer‘s current record company-client may not want the lawyer to represent the plaintiff against the 
second record company because the lawyer might establish precedent that could harm the current record 
company-client in some future employee dispute.  
  10 
after accepting employment, lawyers still need to be prepared to say ―no‖ to clients.  For 
example, a lawyer should reject a vindictive client‘s insistence that the lawyer adopt a 
―scorch and burn‖ strategy in litigation or engage in unethical behavior. 
 
B. BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH CLIENTS 
Given the highly competitive and entrepreneurial nature of the entertainment 
business, it is not surprising that lawyers have opportunities to become involved with 
their clients‘ businesses.36  Significant risk often accompanies a lawyer‘s decision to 
enter into business transactions with a client.  A disgruntled client-partner may be likely 
to file a grievance with the bar‘s disciplinary authority or institute a malpractice action 
against the lawyer.
37
  A lawyer may be subject to third-party suits, such as those filed by 
investors in the business who feel harmed by the lawyer‘s actions.  A business venture 
with a client may also create conflicts of interest with the lawyer‘s current or future 
clients that could result in a loss of business for the lawyer.   
The first step to avoiding the problems intrinsic to lawyer-client business 
transactions is to be sure to recognize them.  There are generally two types of lawyer-
client business transactions.
38
  The first type stems from the subject matter of the 
                                                 
36
 See Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics, 149, 150 in ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK  (R. Thorne 2004-05 ed.).   
37
 See e.g., In re Stover, 104 P.3d 394 (Kan. 2005).  In Stover, the attorney was disbarred in part for 
acquiring an ownership interest that was adverse to her client.  Attorney Kathy Stover offered to serve as a 
business manager and attorney for Michael Jahnz, a musician.  Stover created websites that used Jahnz‘s 
name and likeness without obtaining Jahnz‘s written permission.  Stover refused to remove the websites 
after Jahnz terminated Stover‘s representation.  The Kansas Supreme Court held that Stover had ―acquired 
an interest adverse to the Jahnzes by creating websites that used Michael‘s name and likeness without his 
written permission‖ and that this violated Rule 1.8(a) of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). 
Id. at 838.   It prohibits a lawyer from ―knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership, possessory, security or other 
pecuniary interest adverse to the client unless . . . the client consents in writing thereto.‖  Id.  See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (providing ethical standards the equivalent of KRPC 1.8). 
38
 See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 58 
(identifying several forms of ―Inappropriate Involvement in Client Interests,‖ such as ―[a]cting as a director 
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lawyer‘s representation for the client, such as when a music lawyer and his or her artist-
client each contribute fifty percent of the start up capital for a recording company.  The 
second type of lawyer-client business transaction may be entirely unrelated to the subject 
matter of the representation—for example, when a music-lawyer who represents his or 
her artist-client only in entertainment matters becomes a partner with the client in a real 
estate venture. 
39
  Both types of client-business transactions raise important questions 
about the lawyer‘s loyalty to the client and are governed by each state‘s lawyer code of 
conduct.  The fear is that the lawyer‘s self-interest in the joint business enterprise with the 
client will undermine the lawyer‘s ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of 
the client.   
Model Rule 1.8(a) of the American Bar Association‘s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct lists specific requirements a lawyer-client business transaction must 
meet to avoid an ethical violation.
40
  First, the lawyer must ensure that the transaction and 
terms are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed in writing in a manner 
understood by the client.  Second, the lawyer must inform the client in writing about 
seeking independent advice regarding the transaction and provide the client with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
or officer of a client company[,] [i]nvesting in client securities[,] [b]ecoming involved in one-to-one 
business deals with a client[,] [a]ccepting stock from a client in lieu of a cash fee[,] [a]greeing to contingent 
cash fees[,] [s]oliciting other investors on behalf of a client‘s enterprise‖). 
39
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) cmt. 1.  Comment 1 provides another example of a client-
lawyer business transaction unrelated to the subject matter of the representation: a lawyer, preparing a will 
for a client, learns that the client needs money for a matter unrelated to the subject of the representation and 
the lawyer loans the money to the client.  Id. 
40
 Although not completely coextensive, DR 5-104(A) is the Code‘s counterpart to Rule 1.8(a).  DR 5-104 
(A) provides:  ―A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing 
interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the 
protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.‖ See EC 5-3 (cautioning 
lawyers from accepting or continuing employment when some interest interferes with the lawyer‘s ability 
to exercise independent judgment on behalf of his client); EC 5-5 (noting that lawyers should not suggest to 
the client that he make a gift to the lawyer).   
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reasonable opportunity to procure such advice.
 41
  Third, the lawyer must procure the 
client‘s written and informed consent, signed by the client, to all the essential terms of the 
agreement, including the lawyer‘s role in the transaction and whether the lawyer is 
representing the client in the transaction.
42
  The lawyer may need to seek additional 
informed consent waivers regarding the same transaction if new circumstances create 
conflicts of interest unknown to the client when he last consented to the lawyer‘s 
involvement.  Even if a lawyer-client business transaction is not a ―per se‖ violation of 
the ethical rules, ethical and unethical behavior is a thin line that the lawyer may cross 
inadvertently.
43
  The lawyer who engages in a lawyer-client business transaction that 
complies with the requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) still must ensure that he or she 
maintains ―independent professional judgment‖ as required under Model Rules 2.1, and 
avoid any conflicts of interest between the lawyer and client.
44
 
                                                 
41
 See Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).  In Croce, the widow of the late songwriter and 
singer, Jim Croce, sought damages from several defendants, including Kurnit who was an entertainment 
lawyer.  Kurnit was introduced to the Croces by the other defendants as ―the lawyer.‖  Id. at  887, 889.   
Kurnit outlined the terms of the recording, publishing and management contracts that were executed by the 
Croces.  Id.  The parties never negotiated the terms of the contracts.  Id. at 887.  Kurnit was shareholder and 
participant in the management and publishing businesses that signed the Croces.  Id.  Although the court 
found that the Croces were not Kurnit‘s clients, it held that they reasonably relied on Kurnit‘s explanation 
of the ―legal ramifications‖ of the contracts.  Id. at 890.  This explanation together with his introduction as 
―the lawyer,‖ his interest as a principal in the transactions, ―the Croces lack of independent outside 
representation,‖ and the failure of the Croces to have independent counsel, created a fiduciary duty between 
the Croces and Kurnit.  Id. at 890.  This duty required Kurnit to act fairly and to advise the Croces to obtain 
independent advice about the contracts with the defendants.  Id. at 893-94.  However, Kurnit never advised 
the Croces to seek independent counsel.  Id.  As a result, the court ruled that Kurnit breached his fiduciary 
duty to the Croces and was liable for their legal fees.  Id.  See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 5 n.30 
(explaining that Croce inspired entertainment lawyers to include an acknowledgement provision in 
contracts that the artist was advised to seek independent counsel). 
42
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) cmt. 3 (reporting, in part, that ―[t]he risk to the client is 
[the] greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the 
lawyer‘s financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer‘s representation of the client 
will be materially limited by the lawyer‘s financial interest in the transaction,‖ and noting that Model Rule 
1.7 may preclude the lawyer from ―seeking the client‘s consent to the transaction‖).     
43
 Jodi Brandenburg and David Coher, Going for the Gold: Equity Stakes in Corporate Clients, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1179, 1193 (2001). 
44
 Id.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 & 6 (emphasizing that ―independent judgment 
is an essential element in the lawyer‘s relationship to a client‖; noting that the ‖lawyer‘s own interests 
should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client‖; and warning that ―[i]f the 
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Lawyers and their firms need to remember that developing a good professional 
relationship with a client requires work.
45
  The maintenance of that relationship becomes 
even more challenging when it also becomes a business relationship.
46
  Before a lawyer 
agrees to enter into a business transaction with a client, a comprehensive client and 
subject matter-screening process is key.
47
  Every business transaction with a client 
contains some risk, but the lawyer can better assess the magnitude of the risk by 
thoroughly screening the client and matter beforehand.
48
  If a lawyer accepts the risk and 
becomes his or her client‘s business partner, the lawyer‘s firm should take steps to protect 
itself.  A firm should require an attorney who wants to engage in a business transaction 
with a client to discuss the situation with a partner in the firm.
49
  Even in a sole-
proprietorship situation, the lawyer should consult an independent attorney before 
entering into a business transaction with a client.
50
  Firms should make sure that the 
business transaction between the attorney and the client is clearly and fully memorialized 
in writing, such as in the engagement letter or in a separate document.  Additionally, a 
firm should not allow the attorney who is entering into a business transaction with a 
client to provide legal advice regarding the business transaction.
51
   
Lawyers may become the subject of third-party claims when they become 
involved with the business activities of their clients.  When clients‘ business activities 
fail, investors and others who have experienced financial loss may look to the lawyer for 
                                                                                                                                                 
probity of a lawyer‘s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult if not 
impossible for the lawyer to give the client detached advice‖). 
45
 See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 186. 
46
 Id. 
47
 See supra, Part A. 
48
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.7, at 95.   
49
 Id.  
50
 Id.   
51
 Id. (recommending that if the lawyer in the transaction provides legal advice, it should be ―reviewed and 
approved in advance by a disinterested partner in the firm‖). 
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compensation.
52
  When a lawyer is involved in business transactions with the client, 
outsiders do not perceive the lawyer as independent from the client, but rather view the 
lawyer as having great power and influence over the client.
53
  This perception has caused 
malpractice insurance carriers to exclude from professional-liability coverage those 
lawyers who are directors and officers of their clients‘ business enterprises.54   
Difficulties also arise when lawyers forego a cash fee and instead acquire an 
interest in clients‘ businesses.55  The difficulties include speculation as to possible undue 
influence by the lawyer in obtaining stock or other interests instead of a fee, the 
reasonable amount the lawyer should pay for the interest, the lack of independence a 
lawyer has once the lawyer gains an equity interest in the client, and other conflict of 
interest concerns, such as whether the lawyer must withdraw from representation.
56
  
Generally, once the lawyer owns an interest in the client‘s business, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the lawyer to maintain independent judgment because of the 
lawyer‘s financial interest.57  This belief stems in part from the observation that ―[t]he 
more ties you have, the more questions people may raise.‖58 
 
                                                 
52
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 189. 
53
 See id. at 180.  See also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that, due to the merging roles of 
lawyer, manager and agent, entertainment lawyers ―intentionally or inadvertently exercise a greater degree 
of control over the client than is customary in other law practices‖).  
54
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 182.  See also 
JAY G. FOONBERG, HOW TO START & BUILD A LAW PRACTICE 471-72 (2d ed. 1999).   
55
 See generally Brandenburg & Coher, supra note 43.  In an effort to obtain higher profits, lawyers have 
begun investing in the initial public offerings of clients.  Id. at 1179.  Although receiving an equity stake in 
a client is not new, the vast amount of potential profits for lawyers is new.  Id. at 1179-80.  See also Abdo 
& Sahl, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that a lawyer may accept an ownership interest in literary property when 
representing a client in transactions related to the property). 
56
 Brandenburg & Coher, supra note 43, at 1181. 
57
 Id. at 1189.  The article suggests that although lawyers should instruct clients to seek outside counsel 
before issuing the stock to the lawyer, this suggestion is often unrealistic because a client offering an equity 
share in itself probably lacks the money to hire another lawyer to review the deal.  Id. at 1183. 
58
 Id. at 1182 (quoting John F. Olson, chair of the ABA Business Law Section‘s Committee on Lawyer 
Business Ethics).   
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C. SCOPE OF RETENTION 
Lawyers can minimize the risk of a malpractice claim by ensuring that clients 
understand the scope of representation.  Lawyers must orally explain the nature and terms 
of the professional relationship in a manner readily understood by their clients.  Lawyers 
should also have a written engagement letter to help ensure that both the lawyer and the 
client clearly understand the purpose, nature, and scope of the lawyer‘s and client‘s 
responsibilities.
59
  The engagement letter should clearly identify the client, including the 
client‘s proper legal name when the client is a business.60   Lawyers should be sensitive 
to third-party liability when signing an engagement letter with a client.
61
 
                                                 
59
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.9, at 96.  See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 3-4.  Although it is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the contents of an engagement letter, a lawyer should 
include in any engagement letter a provision that describes the grounds and process for the lawyer‘s 
withdrawal from representation. 
60
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.9, at 98. 
61
 See Even Street Prods. v. Shkat Arrow Hafer & Weber, LLP, No. 05CV3834, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42397, (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008) (the spelling of the law firm‘s name in the case heading of the reported 
decision differs from the spelling in the text of the opinion).  In 2000, New York Times Television and 
Diamond Time Ltd., produced a documentary about Sly Stone titled ―Jimi and Sly: The Skin I‘m In.‖  Id. at 
1.  That same year Showtime Networks broadcast the documentary.  The production used Sly Stone‘s 
music without authorization of the copyright holders, Sony and Warner/Chappell (hereinafter Warner).  Id. 
at 2.  Sony and Warner retained Shukat, Arrow, Hafer & Webber, LLP (hereinafter Shukat) to prosecute a 
copyright infringement action.  The Shukat firm entered into a written agreement with the New York Times 
Television attorneys to toll the statute of limitations in hope of reaching a settlement.  Id. at 3.  That 
agreement expired and Sony and Warner were barred from suing for copyright infringement.  Sony and 
Warner assigned to the plaintiff, Even Street Productions (hereinafter Even), all of the rights and interests 
of Sly Stone‘s musical career. Id. at 1-2.  Even expected to benefit from a resolution of the copyright 
infringement claims which Sony and Warner could no longer bring because they were barred by the statute 
of limitations.  Even also had separate agreements with Sony and Warner which assigned and transferred 
any and all claims or causes of action Sony and Warner had against any third party.  Even sued Shukat for 
legal malpractice.  The court denied the law firm‘s motion to dismiss and held that Even could sue Shukat 
for legal malpractice.  The court determined that Even‘s agreements with Sony and Warner could be 
reasonably construed as assigning not only copyright claims but also legal malpractice claims.  See also 
Phillip M. Callesen and James W. May, Potential Legal Opinion Liability for Ohio Business Lawyers, 23 
THE OHIO LAWYER 13 (Jan./Feb. 2009) (discussing liability for lawyers who provide opinions to clients 
that are relied on by third parties, and reviewing Dean Foods v. Arthur J. Pappathanasi, 18 Mass. L Rep. 
598 (2004), that resulted in a $7.2 million judgment against a seller‘s law firm for negligent 
misrepresentation in issuing a legal opinion for the sale of a business, id. at 15). 
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The engagement letter should state clearly the basis and amount of the lawyer‘s 
fee.
62
  The letter also should address other financial issues, including the advancement of 
expenses, the computation of interest on outstanding balances, special firm charges (e.g. 
copying and delivery of documents), and billing procedures.
63
  The engagement letter 
also should identify the client‘s responsibilities, such as notifying the lawyer of any 
material changes that may affect the lawyer‘s work.64  In multiple-client settings, lawyers 
should at a minimum inform all clients in writing about the effect of joint representation 
on the attorney-client privilege.
65
  In addition to a written document outlining the rights 
                                                 
62
 For a recent entertainment law case involving a dispute over a fee agreement, see King v. Fox, 418 F.3d 
121 (2d Cir. 2005).  Edward King was a member of the Southern rock band, Lynyrd Skynyrd, from 1972 to 
1975.  Id. at 124.  After MCA Records and the band refused to pay King his artist royalties, King hired 
attorney Lawrence Fox.  Id. 124-25.  Due to King‘s limited resources, Fox—who specialized in personal 
injury cases—agreed to represent King on a contingency fee basis.  Id.  The brief, written agreement stated 
that Fox was entitled to one-third of ―any money recovered from‖ MCA Records.  Id. at 125.  On King‘s 
behalf, Fox secured a settlement with MCA Records related only to King‘s artist royalties.  Fox then relied 
on the written contingency fee agreement to obtain one-third of King‘s writer royalties as well as his artist 
royalties—even though Fox never represented King in writer royalty matters.  Id. at 126.  King sued Fox 
for malpractice, alleging in part that the terms of the contingency fee agreement were unconscionable.  The 
federal district court granted summary judgment to Fox, finding that the terms were within a reasonable 
range, that Fox clearly explained the terms of the agreement to King, and that King ratified Fox‘s conduct. 
King v. Fox, No. 917 CIV 4134, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 462, at 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2004).  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals on 
the issue of whether King ratified Fox‘s potentially unconscionable conduct.  King, 418 F.3d at 137. The 
New York Court of Appeals answered all three questions affirmatively, but with significant qualifications.  
King v. Fox, 7 N.Y.3d 181, 189, 51 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (2006).  First, the court held that a ratification of an 
attorney‘s fee agreement can occur during a period of continuous representation, ―so long as the client has 
full knowledge of the relevant facts and has acquiesced.‖  Id. at 191, 51 N.E.2d at 1191.  Second, the court 
held that a ratification of an attorney‘s fee agreement can occur during a period of continuous 
representation even if attorney misconduct occurs during that period so long as the client‘s acquiescence is 
not obtained as a result of the misconduct.  Id.  Third, the court held that a ratification of an attorney‘s fee 
agreement that might otherwise be considered voidable as unconscionable can occur if the client is fully 
informed, has equal bargaining power, and knowingly and voluntarily affirms an existing fee arrangement 
with ―both a full understanding of the facts that made the agreement voidable and knowledge of his or her 
rights as a client.‖  Id. at 193, 51 N.E.2d at 1192.   
63
  SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.9, at 101.  See ABA CENTER FOR PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY, 
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 61-75 (5th ed. 2003).  See generally, Rachel Abramowitz, 
Birkhead Gets Tentative Ruling Against Ex-Attorney, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at E2 (discussing, in part, 
the misunderstandings and fee dispute between Attorney Debra Opri and her former client, Larry Birkhead, 
who claimed to have fathered Anna Nicole Smith‘s girl; Birkhead sued her for fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty and malpractice and the California Bar Association also investigated her conduct).  
64
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54.   
65
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.9, at 99.  The representation of multiple clients also presents conflict 
of interest issues.  See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that some commentators believe that 
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and responsibilities of both the lawyer and the client, the lawyer should discuss these 
matters with the client to ensure that the client truly understands the representation 
agreement.
66
   
The engagement letter also should clearly state the scope of the lawyer‘s 
authority.  Under Model Rule 1.2, the client has authority to settle a case.
67
  The 
engagement letter should expressly identify to what extent, if any, the client delegates 
settlement authority to the lawyer.
68
  A lawyer should be aware that even if there is an 
agreement granting the lawyer authority to engage in settlement discussions with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
lawyers should refuse to simultaneously represent an artist and a manager in negotiating their artist-
management agreement because of conflict of interest concerns) (citing Jack P. Sahl, Ethics for 
Entertainment Lawyers: Avoiding Conflicts of Interest, 12
th
 ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL FOLK ALLIANCE 
CONFERENCE (Cleveland Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, Feb. 11, 2000)).  For an example of a client feeling 
betrayed in the context of multiple representation, see Bolton v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 2004 NY Slip 
Op. 5118U, 798 N.Y.S.2d 343; 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1607.  The plaintiff, the singer Michael Bolton, 
sued his lawyers, Weil, Gotshal & Manges (WGM) for breaching its fiduciary duties in representing him in 
a copyright action brought by Three Brothers Action.  Id. at 2.  Bolton contended that WGM failed (1) to 
advise him of conflicts of interests arising from WGM‘s joint representation of Bolton, his record company 
(Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.), and his publishing company (Warner-Chappell Ltd.), and (2) to advise 
him of settlement developments or follow his instructions regarding settlement.  Id. at 2.  Bolton argued 
that WGM did not discuss with him his indemnity obligations to his publishing and record companies and 
did not inform him of favorable settlement offers.  Id. at 2-3.  See also Bolton v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 
LLP, 2005 NY Slip Op. 51410U, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (denying a 
motion by Bolton‘s former personal lawyers, Epstein, Levinsohn, Bodine, Hurwitz & Weinstein, to dismiss 
a third-party complaint against them, and permitting a claim for contribution against them by WGM).  See 
also Anthony Lin, Singer Sues Weil,Gotshal & Manges Over Joint Representation, 230 N.Y. L. J. 1, Dec. 
22, 2003 (reporting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury award of $5.4 million 
against Bolton, his co-writer, music publisher and record company for copyright infringement, and noting 
that Bolton sued WGM for $30 million in damages alleging that the firm ―was conflicted‖ when it defended 
him and other parties). 
66
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54. 
67
 The Code counterpart to Rule 1.2 is EC 7-7 (emphasizing that the ultimate authority to accept a 
settlement rests with the client).  See also EC 7-8 (explaining that a lawyer should ensure that the client 
makes informed decisions, and should defer to the client when the client decides ―to forego legally 
available objectives‖).  See generally DR 7-101(A)(1) (providing that a lawyer must not intentionally fail to 
seek the client‘s lawful objectives); DR 7-101(A)(2) (stating that lawyers must ―not fail to carry out a 
contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services,‖ but noting that lawyers may 
withdraw pursuant to DR 2-110). 
68
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.9, at 99.  The lawyer‘s settlement authority must be specific.  Id.  
Even if a client grants a lawyer settlement authority in an engagement letter, the lawyer should be mindful 
that subsequent client instructions can override this authority.  Id. (citing Lewis v. Uselton, 202 Ga. App. 
875, 879 (1992) (holding that although an engagement letter granted the lawyer ―full ‗power and authority 
to settle,‘‖ the lawyer‘s acceptance of a $22,500 settlement offer was unauthorized when the clients told the 
attorney they did not want to settle for anything under $50,000)). 
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other side, this does not mean that the lawyer has authority to actually accept or reject 
settlement offers.
69
  If the lawyer wants specific settlement authority, the lawyer should 
discuss the matter with the client and obtain written authorization.
70
  Even if the client 
grants specific settlement authority, it is generally wise to communicate the settlement 
offer to the client prior to the lawyer accepting or rejecting it.    
The engagement letter needs to describe the goals of representation—particularly 
in an entertainment law practice, where the lawyer often performs different roles.
71
  It is 
important that the entertainment lawyer listen to the client‘s wishes in establishing the 
goals of representation.  If the representation involves litigation, the client may want to 
settle a case early or may want to explore alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration or 
mediation.  The lawyer should have a clear understanding of the client‘s objectives at the 
beginning of representation so that he or she can devise and implement a plan to achieve 
them.
72
  A clear understanding of the client‘s expectations at the start of the attorney-
client relationship also permits the lawyer to address any unreasonable expectations.  
A lawyer‘s representation of a client generally includes ―(1) gathering facts, (2) 
advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the opposing party, (4) researching the law, 
(5) drafting correspondence and documents, (6) negotiating, and (7) representing the 
                                                 
69
 Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 230 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that ―[t]he authority to negotiate . 
. . is far different from the authority to agree to a specific settlement.‖); Johnson v. Schmitz, 237 F. Supp. 
2d 183, 192 (Dist. Conn. 2002) (stating that authority to enter into negotiations is not the same as authority 
to agree to a settlement).     
70
  See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2.  (―A lawyer who receives from opposing counsel 
an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly 
inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be 
acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or reject an offer.‖)  See generally DR 5-
106 (although there is no direct counterpart in the Code to Rule 1.4, DR 5-106 suggests that a lawyer 
should not make an aggregate settlement on behalf of multiple clients unless each client has consented to 
the settlement after being fully advised of important details).  
71
 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19 in Part A. 
72
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54. 
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client in court.‖73  However, the lawyer and client may agree to limit the representation 
by excluding some of the services that lawyers generally provide.
74
  For example, a 
lawyer may agree to negotiate a publishing contract for an author but decline to shop the 
author‘s work to other publishing companies, review the work for possible defamation, or 
counsel the client regarding the tax consequences of forming a corporation.  A client 
might prefer limited representation because the client has limited objectives or cannot 
afford all of the services generally included in full representation.
75
   
Before a lawyer agrees to limit the scope of the representation, the lawyer needs 
to confirm that limiting the scope is reasonable under the circumstances.
76
  To determine 
whether limiting the scope is reasonable, the lawyer should evaluate the complexity of 
the case, transaction or other matter, the importance of the matter, the judge or jury‘s 
discretion in reviewing the matter, how the dispute will be resolved, and other resources 
the client might have to aid in representation.
77
    
Clients who agree to limited representation tend to be happy with the results, as 
evidenced in part by the low rate of malpractice claims against limited-assistance 
                                                 
73
 MARK H. TOUHEY III ET AL., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE, 2002 A.B.A. Modest 
Means Task Force 2,  n.6 (quoting Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 
28 FAM. L.Q. 421, 422-23 (1994)).   
74
 Id. at 2. 
75
 Id. at 2-7.  
76
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7.   
77
 TOUHEY, supra note 73, at 57.  ―[T]he best candidates for limited scope assistance have a degree of 
emotional detachment, the willingness and ability to handle ‗some paperwork,‘ some capacity to gather and 
analyze financial information, reasonable decisiveness, willingness and ability to handle details and follow 
through on obligations, and the necessary time to perform delegated tasks.‖  Id. (citing M. SUE TALIA, A 
CLIENT‘S GUIDE TO LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES xiii (1997)).  As the complexity of the issues increase, so 
does the need for lawyer support and advice.  Id. at 59.  For example, the lawyer would need to provide 
more legal services in the case of a divorce involving custody disputes and division of pension plans than in 
an uncontested divorce where no children or significant property is involved.  Id.  
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attorneys.
78
  This may be because limited representation is more client-centered than full 
representation.
79
  Limited representation often provides the client with a high degree of 
control over his or her legal affairs and offers a more affordable price than with full 
representation where the client is expected to surrender his money and control to the 
lawyer—giving him or her ―all [of] the responsibility.‖80  It is important to remember, 
however, that the decision to limit the scope of representation does not excuse the 
lawyer‘s obligation to provide competent representation.81   
 
D. TIME LIMITATIONS AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS   
Lawyer codes of conduct provide different conflict of interest rules depending on 
whether the lawyer is representing a current client against another current client, or 
instead, a current client against a former client.
82
  Thus, the point in time at which a 
person is no longer a current client has major consequences for the lawyer.  
Consequently, in both current and former client situations, lawyers need to understand the 
timing aspects of the attorney-client relationship.   
                                                 
78
 See id. at 51.  ―[T]here are fewer rather than more malpractice claims when lawyers unbundled services.‖  
Id. (quoting Leigh P. Perkins, Unbundling Your Services Makes Some Clients Happy, LAW‘S WKLY USA, 
Dec. 18, 1995).   
79
 See NELSON, supra note 15, at 27-40.  As purveyors of services, lawyers must be ―client-centered as well 
as case-oriented‖ and also describing a ―client-centered orientation‖ as one where the lawyers ―gather as 
much information as [they] can about how [their] clients see their situations, and factoring that information 
into the solutions [they] design for them.‖  Id. at 27.   
80
 Touhey, supra note 73, at 52 (citing MICHAEL A. CANE, WELCOME TO THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY 2, in 
THE CHANGING FACE OF LEGAL PRACTICE: A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ―UNBUNDLED‖ LEGAL SERVICES 
(Vol. 4, 2000).   
81
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7.  See Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance 
Agreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, 11 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 915-16 (1998) (noting 
that although clients may seek limited representation for various reasons, ―legal ethics norms expect 
lawyers to maximize their clients‘ positions, regardless of whether the clients pay them to do so‖).   
82
  The Code‘s conflict of interest provisions are found at DR 5-101 and DR 5-105.  Unlike the Model 
Rules, the Code does not have a provision expressly dealing with conflicts involving former clients.  Code 
jurisdictions nevertheless followed the ―substantial relationship‖ test as first formulated by the courts for 
resolving conflicts involving former clients.  See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing the 
substantial relationship test). 
  21 
Model Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts between current clients.  As a general rule, a 
lawyer cannot represent a client if the representation will be ―directly adverse to another 
client‖ or if the representation would ―materially limit‖ the lawyer‘s representation of 
another client.
83
  However, under Model Rule 1.7 (b)(1)-(4), even if a conflict exists with 
another current client, the lawyer can still represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.84   
                                                 
83
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (1)–(2).  Cf. EC 5-15 (exhorting that ―a lawyer should 
never represent in litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests‖ but noting that a lawyer 
may represent multiple clients in non-litigation matters only if their interests vary slightly); DR 5-105(B) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from ―represent[ing] multiple clients if doing so will adversely affect the 
representation‖).  It is worth noting that conflicts of interest are common in the entertainment industry.  At 
least one well-know entertainment lawyer has gone so far as to suggest that, ―[a]nyone that does not have 
conflicts is not a player in Hollywood.‖ Adam Sandler, Legal Eagles Swoop Down on Hollywood Suit: 
Conflict of Interest: Latest Legal Scuffle, VARIETY, Aug. 28, 1995.  The New York Times reported that the 
prominent entertainment lawyer, Bert Fields, ―has drawn some heat in Hollywood for simultaneously 
representing both talent and studios.‖  See Allison Hope Weiner, Telling Hollywood It’s Out of Order, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 15, 2005, at S1.  Fields said that after he discloses the conflict to his clients, ―[t]hey usually 
think it‘s a great advantage.‖  See id.  See also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that sometimes 
the ―package deal‖—where a lawyer simultaneously represents a successful movie producer and a famous 
actor—may result in a lucrative production in which ―[e]veryone wins‖). 
84
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).  Cf. DR 5-105(C) (stating that in situations covered 
in DR 5-105 (A) (a lawyer shall not accept proffered employment if his independent judgment is likely to 
be adversely affected) and (B) (a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if his independent 
judgment on behalf of one client is adversely affected by representation of another client), a lawyer ―may 
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each‖ and each 
consents after full disclosure to the representation ).  See generally EC 5-17 (providing that before a lawyer 
represents multiple clients in a non-litigation matter, the lawyer ―should explain fully to each client the 
implications of the common representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients 
consent‖).  The Model Rules make it clear now that the lawyer may not ―represent both Client A and B in 
the case of A v. B.‖  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS THE LAWYER‘S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 280-81 (2005).  It is also clear ―that Rule 1.7 does not 
  22 
Even after following the steps in Model Rule 1.7 (b)(1)-(4), a lawyer should be 
wary about representing current clients with adverse interests.  For example, even if the 
lawyer can show the representation was not prohibited by law, that it did not involve a 
claim brought by one client against another client in the same proceeding, and that each 
client gave informed consent in writing, the lawyer still has to prove that he reasonably 
believed he could provide competent and diligent representation to each client.  In many 
cases, the lawyer‘s belief that such competent and diligent representation was possible 
will not be reasonable by the very fact that the lawyer is representing one client against 
another.
85
  When representing two clients against each other, there is a substantial risk 
that one or both will feel betrayed, in part, because of the fear that the lawyer failed to 
zealously pursue a client‘s interests.86   
When a current client no longer employs a lawyer, the client becomes a former 
client.  The timing of when a current client becomes a former client is not always clear.  
Nevertheless, a lawyer owes former clients certain ethical duties.  Model Rule 1.9 
identifies these obligations, and provides that a lawyer cannot represent a client against a 
former client in ―the same or a substantially related matter‖ when the client‘s interests are 
―materially adverse to the interests of the former client,‖ unless the former client gives 
informed written consent.
87
  When a new matter is the same or substantially similar, it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
absolutely prohibit a lawyer from representing adverse parties outside of the litigation context . . . if the 
lawyer secures an adequate waiver.‖  Id. at 282.    
85
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).  
86
 See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6.  Cf. EC 5-16 (providing that a lawyer should advise multiple clients of any 
―circumstance that might cause multiple clients to question the undivided loyalty of the lawyer‖).  
87
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a).  Cf. EC 4-6 (requiring a lawyer to preserve the confidences 
of a client after the termination of employment).  This obligation generally precludes a lawyer from 
representing an interest adverse to that of a former client in a substantially related matter.  See Spivey v. 
Bender, 77 Ohio App. 3d 17, 23 (6th Dist. 1991).  See also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 5.  In the case of 
Fargnoli v. Ziffren, Brittenham & Branca, Case No. BC068280 (1992 L.A. Sup. Ct.), Fargnoli—a former 
manager for Prince—was previously represented by the defendant law firm.  Alex Citron and Robert W. 
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generally assumed that the lawyer gained confidences relevant to the new matter.
88
  
Additionally, even if the lawyer is representing a client against a former client in a matter 
that is not substantially similar, the lawyer cannot use information gained during the 
former representation against the former client unless the client consents.
89
   
Although Model Rule 1.9 limits a lawyer‘s ability to represent a current client 
against a former client, Model Rule 1.9 is not as restrictive as Model Rule 1.7.  Model 
Rule 1.9‘s substantial relationship test reflects a concern for protecting clients‘ loyalties 
and confidences, but it also reflects other competing policy concerns.  Those concerns 
include lawyer mobility and the desire for clients to hire the lawyer of their own 
                                                                                                                                                 
Welkos, Hollywood Firm Sued Again, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at D1.  The law firm later represented 
Prince when Fargnoli sued the entertainer.  Id.  Fargnoli alleged that the firm had disclosed confidential 
communications to Prince.  Id.  The court granted summary judgment to the law firm, noting that a written 
release precluded Fargnoli‘s conflict of interest claims.  See James Bates, Judge Dismisses Suit by Prince’s 
Ex-Manager, L.A. TIMES, April 20, 1993, at D2. 
88
 See Donald R. McMinn, Note: ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased Use of 
Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1231, 1250 (1990).  See also 
Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App. 3d 17, 23 (6th Dist. 1991) (quoting Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (explaining that when the lawyer represents a client whose interests are adverse to that of a 
former client, there is a concern that the lawyer obtained confidential information during the 
representation).  Some courts take the position that where no confidential information was revealed during 
the former representation, there is no conflict of interest barring representation of a new client.  See 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978). 
The determination of whether there is a substantial relationship turns on the possibility, or 
appearance thereof, that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in 
relation to the subsequent matter in which disqualification is sought.  The rule thus does 
not necessarily involve any inquiry into the imponderables involved in the degree of 
relationship between the two matters but instead involves a realistic appraisal of the 
possibility that confidences had been disclosed in the one matter which will be harmful to 
the client in the other. 
Id. at 224.  But see Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997) (finding that the substantial 
relationship test should apply even if no confidential information is acquired during the course of 
representation).  Accord E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 397 (S.D. Tex. 1969). 
The rule against representing conflicting interests disqualifies an attorney from appearing 
adversely to his former client in litigation growing out of the subject matter of the prior 
representation. The Court has held that the former client's failure to disclose confidential 
information to his attorney does not disable him from moving to disqualify. 
Id.   
89
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (C)(1).  Cf. EC 4-5 (barring a lawyer from ―us[ing] 
information acquired during the representation of a client to the disadvantage of that client‖). 
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choosing.
90
   In 2009 the ABA amended Model Rule 1.10 that provides for imputed 
disqualification to further promote lawyer mobility and client choice of counsel.
91
  When 
a lawyer departs one firm for another, Model Rule 1.10 now permits the departing 
lawyer‘s new firm to avoid having the migratory lawyer‘s conflicts imputed to it by 
erecting a screen around the new lawyer.
92
  The screen should be in place when the 
migratory lawyer joins the new firm to protect against the lawyer‘s involvement in the 
conflicted matter.
93
 
In deciding whether Model Rule 1.7 or 1.9 is applicable for analyzing a conflict of 
interest problem, the lawyer must ascertain whether the client is proceeding against 
another current or former client of the lawyer.  Timing is important.  At what point does a 
current client become a former client for purposes of conflict of interest analysis?   
                                                 
90
 McMinn, supra note 88, at 1250.  See e.g., Forbes v. NAMS International Inc., No. 3:07-CV-0039, Slip 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45161 (N.D.N.Y 2007).  The defendant, NAMS International, developed patented 
software for multimedia entertainment.  Forbes and other plaintiffs invested in NAMS allegedly based on 
material misrepresentations concerning its capabilities and ability to obtain patent rights in new 
technologies in the field.  Id. at 5.  Attorney Ronald J. Benjamin represented the plaintiffs.  He also 
represented the defendant, NAMS, in its earlier lawsuit against Spectra.Net Communications after a 
proposed merger of the two companies failed.  During the merger negotiations, NAMS shared information 
concerning its current and future technology.  The district court found that even though eight years had 
passed, there was a substantial relationship between the issues raised in both cases and a high probability 
that Benjamin had access to confidential information about NAMS that would be harmful to it in the instant 
case.  Id. at 13-15.  The court granted NAMS‘ disqualification motion against Benjamin and stated that the 
need to preserve the integrity of and public confidence in the judicial process overrides the plaintiffs‘ 
choice of legal representation in this case.  Id. at 15.  See also Disqualification Motion, No. 6, 23 ENT. L. & 
FIN. 4 (Sept. 2007) (discussing the holding in Forbes v. NAMS International Inc., No. 3:07-CV-0039, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45161 (N.D.N.Y 2007)). 
91
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.10.  See 25, NO. 16 ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF CONDUCT 420 
(AUG. 5, 2009) (commenting that the ―[r]ules for the first time provide that private law firms may screen 
incoming lawyers to avoid the imputation of the lawyer‘s former-client conflicts to the rest of the firm, 
even without getting consent from the affected former clients‖ and noting that if ―certain procedural 
requirements are met, a screened lawyer‘s colleagues may represent clients in matters that the lawyer 
would be prohibited from handling under the rule on former client conflicts‖). 
92
 See 25, NO 16. ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF CONDUCT 418 (AUG. 5, 2009) (recognizing that the ABA 
approved a modest ―‗housekeeping amendment‘ to Model Rule 1.10‖ that clarifies that the new non-
consensual screening procedures in the rule may be used to prevent a firm‘s imputed disqualification only  
when a lawyer has moved from one firm to another‖ (citing 25 ABA/BNA Law Man. Prof. Conduct 420)).   
93
 Cf. Kala v. Aluminum Smelting Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ohio 1998) (specifically noting that ―all 
cases‖ require the screen to be in place when the attorney joins the firm‖—it is ―too late‖ to screen after the 
filing of a disqualification motion) with MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (a)(2)(i)-(iii) (outlining 
screen requirements including that there be a ―timely implementation of a screen,‖  id. at cmt. 10) 
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Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.3 provides that, unless representation is terminated 
under Model Rule 1.16, a lawyer should ―carry through to conclusion‖ all the matters 
undertaken for the client.
94
  If the lawyer‘s representation has been limited to a specific 
matter, the attorney-client relationship ends when the attorney completes that specific 
matter.
95
  However, if the lawyer has worked for the client for a long time on assorted 
matters, the client may assume that the lawyer continues to serve his interests until the 
lawyer expressly notifies him of withdrawal.
96
  As Comment 4 suggests, ―doubts about 
whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified in writing.‖97  Just as 
with engagement letters, good practice dictates that lawyers send clients a conclusion of 
services letter.
98
   
In IBM Corp. v. Levin,
99
 the Third Circuit discussed when a current client 
becomes a former client.  In IBM, the court found that the law firm had an on-going 
attorney-client relationship with both IBM and the party the firm was representing against 
IBM.
100
  Although the firm did not have a specific retainer agreement with IBM when it 
filed its compliant against IBM, the court found that ―the pattern of repeat retainers, both 
before and after the filing of the complaint, supports the finding of a continuous 
relationship.‖101    
                                                 
94
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 4.  See also DR 7-101(A)(2) (reminding lawyers that 
they shall not intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment with clients for professional services 
unless the lawyers withdraw under DR 2-110). 
95
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 4. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54. 
99
 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978). 
100
 Id. at 281. 
101
 Id.  See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 840 
(1992) (discussing the difficult situation where the lawyer continuously represented a client, but was not 
presently involved in a specific matter for the client and stating that ―continuing clientship is usually not a 
relationship ascertainable from the intentions and behavior of the parties, but rather a concept imposed with 
little evidentiary support by a court . . . in order to resolve one or another question‖).   
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E. IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE OFFICE 
 A law firm is often faced with a malpractice claim that it could have avoided by 
implementing internal controls in its office.  Internal controls help ensure that common 
errors do not occur.
102
  For example, although calendaring errors are a leading cause of 
malpractice, a firm should be able to avoid these errors by establishing an office-wide 
calendar with a well-defined procedure for its use.
103
  A calendaring system needs to be 
user-friendly; it should be easy to learn, use, and maintain.
104
  The calendaring system 
should also have an off-site backup in case of problems in the central system.
105
  The 
system should be able to find discrepancies between the central and back-up calendar, 
and should have a tracking system to know who made changes and what changes were 
made.
106
  Further, the calendaring system should give each open matter a review date so 
the firm can regularly review each file.
107
   
 Law firms should consider an additional internal control by establishing 
committees to help prevent malpractice and to enhance the quality of work performed for 
clients.
108
  Just as firms benefit from a managing partner or a managing committee, firms 
also benefit from such ―quality control committees.‖109  The firm should determine the 
                                                 
102
 See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 50 (noting that certain ―organizational controls and 
individual practice procedures‖ can improve the overall competence of attorneys and the quality of the 
services they render‖). 
103
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 72.  
104
 Id. at 52. 
105
 Id. 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id.   
108
 SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 51-52.  
109
 Id. at 52.  Smith and Mallen suggest several names for committees aimed at preventing malpractice, 
including: ―(1) quality control; (2) quality assurance; (3) risk management; and (4) professional 
responsibility.‖  Id. § 2.3, at 52.  ―Quality Control Committees‖ or ―Quality Assurance Committees‖ are the 
preferred names because the focus is on increasing quality, as opposed to decreasing risk, and generally 
carry a more positive connotation.  Id.   
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committee‘s responsibilities, who will serve on it, and the extent to which the 
committee‘s determinations are final.110  Possible functions that the committee could 
perform include: considering possible ethical problems; developing a procedure for 
opening a new file; identifying criteria for evaluating clients and claims; establishing a 
billing procedure; maintaining form files; preventing document loss; developing a policy 
for referrals, scheduling projects and events; and creating stress- and alcohol-awareness 
programs.
111
  
 An important internal control is one aimed at avoiding conflicts of interest.  
Relying solely on lawyers‘ memories to uncover conflicts is no longer sufficient.112  
Instead, firms should have a ―systemized procedure for documenting and analyzing 
potential conflicts for every new client and new matter accepted by the firm.‖113  
Conflict-check systems must provide a method for matching names.
114
  If a firm has 
multiple offices, the names of the clients and matters of one office should be accessible 
by any other office in the firm.
115
  Additionally, when the firm accepts a new case, it 
should circulate a ―new matter memo‖ to lawyers and support staff within the firm.116  
This memo should identify the parties and the intake attorney.
117
  The memo also should 
state what the case is about and what services the firm will provide.
118
  By circulating the 
                                                 
110
 Id. § 2.3, at 52-53.   
111
 Id. § 2.4, at 55-58 (providing a more extensive list of possible committee functions). 
112
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 57. 
113
 Id.  
114
 See id.   
115
 Id.  Page 85 features a chart entitled ―Types of Names to Track in Conflict System.‖  This chart gives 
the list of important people to track depending on the type of representation.  For example, for a probate 
case, the chart suggests tracking the decedent, personal representative, the ―spouse/children/heirs/devisees‖ 
and the ―trustee/guardian/conservator.‖  Id.  
116
 Id. at 58.  See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.4, at 56 (evaluating a client or transaction should 
―require[] consultation between the originating attorney and another partner or committee‖). 
117
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 58. 
118
 Id. 
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memo, other lawyers are warned about accepting prospective clients and matters that 
have conflicts with the new client.
119
    
 It also is essential that firms establish a system to ensure adequate documentation 
of work.
120
  For example, preferably more than one person should check the content and 
accuracy of all documents—such as letters, briefs, contracts, and motions—before the 
documents leave the firm.
121
  Each client and matter should have its own file for all 
documents the lawyer prepares or receives.
122
  Relevant documents should be filed 
daily.
123
  This ensures that documents are not misplaced and that others will know that 
they are looking at an up-to-date file.
124
   
 
F. IDENTIFYING ATTORNEY COMPETENCY ISSUES 
Lawyers should provide their clients with competent representation; failure to do 
so can lead to a malpractice action,
125
 Rule 11 sanctions
126
 and discipline.
127
  Model Rule 
                                                 
119
 Id.  
120
 Id. at 59. 
121
 Id. See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 5, § 2.4, at 51-52, 55-58.  A law firm‘s quality assurance 
committee should oversee ―[w]ork control‖ issues.  Id. at 56-57. 
122
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 59. 
123
 Id. 
124
 Id. 
125
 See Battle v. Thornton, 646 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1994) (stating that in a jurisdiction that does not certify 
specialists, the standard of care at issue in a malpractice action is that of an ordinary lawyer).  Lawyers who 
communicate that their practice is ―limited to‖ or that they ―primarily handle‖ or ―specialize in‖ 
entertainment law may be held to a higher standard of care than other lawyers.  See Wright v. Williams, 
121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1975) (noting that ―a lawyer holding himself out to the public and the 
profession as specializing in an area of the law must exercise the skill, prudence and diligence exercised by 
other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity specializing in the same field‖). 
126
 See e.g., Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, No. 4:06-CV-132-4, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1435395, 8 
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions against Heslep‘s attorney were appropriate for filing a 
frivolous motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs‘ attorney).  In addition to Rule 11 sanctions, the court 
may exercise broad inherent authority to discipline attorneys.  See Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., 477 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2007).  In Muzikowski, the plaintiff sued Paramount Pictures‘ claiming that its 
film, Hardball, about a little league coach, ―was a thinly disguised biography of him‖ and that it was 
defamatory and placed Muzikowski in a false light.  Id. at 903.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court‘s grant of summary judgment to the defendant.  It also upheld the court‘s award of reasonable 
attorney fees as a sanction against the plaintiff‘s lawyers under Rule 37(b)(2) for willfully disobeying a 
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1.1 helps define competency and states the basic principle that ―[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.
128
  Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.‖129  Determination of whether a lawyer is competent to undertake 
                                                                                                                                                 
court order to identify the documents that the plaintiff intended to use at trial.  Id. at 909 (citing Johnson v. 
Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999) and holding that ―[d]istrict courts possess wide latitude in 
fashioning appropriate sanctions and evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys‘ fees requested.‖).  
―Rather than comply with the trial court‘s order, [the plaintiff‘s] lawyers identified 14,599 pages of 
documents that they characterized as ‗for possible use at trial.‘‖  Id. at 909.  When questioned about their 
failure to comply with the court‘s order, the lawyers ―mysterious[ly]‖ claimed the court had never issued  
such an order.  Id.  
127
 See e.g., Att‘y. Grievance Comm'n v. Midlen, 395 Md. 628, 911 A.2d 852 (2006).  Jimmy Swaggart 
Ministries (JSM) hired attorney John Midlen Jr. to represent JSM for royalty distributions by the Librarian 
of Congress for cable TV broadcasts of JSM religious programs.  Id. at 632, 911 A.2d at 855.  Initially, 
Midlen and JSM agreed that Midlen would deduct his fees from the distribution checks and remit the 
remaining balance to JSM.  Id.  JSM instructed Midlen that it no longer wanted Milden to deduct his fees 
before submitting the royalties to JSM.  Id. at 634, 911 A.2d at 856.  Milden continued to deduct his fees 
and was fired.  JSM claimed that Milden took months to return its client files and failed to provide 
―understandable legal bills‖ and an accounting of funds collected on JSM‘s behalf.  Id. at 635-37, 911 A.2d 
at 857-58.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals suspended him from practice for eighteen months.  
Id. at 630, 911 A.2d at 853.  Imposing reciprocal discipline, the Court of Appeals of Maryland suspended 
Milden for eighteen months but found insufficient evidence to have the suspensions run concurrently.  Id. 
at 652, 911 A.2d at 867.  See also Rosenthal v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 612, 615, 738 P.2d 723, 725 (1987) 
(disbarring attorney Rosenthal for his representation of actress Doris Day Melcher, her late husband, and 
her son because of egregious misconduct, such as conducting transactions with undisclosed conflicts of 
interest, taking positions adverse to former clients, overstating expenses and double-billing for legal fees, 
filing fraudulent claims, and giving false testimony).   
128
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1.  The Code counterpart to Rule 1.1 is DR 6-101.  DR 6-
101(A) (1) provides that a lawyer must not ―[h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he 
is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.‖  In 
addition, DR 6-101(A)(2) & (3) prohibit a lawyer from handling a legal matter without adequate 
preparation and from neglecting ―a legal matter entrusted to him.‖ 
129
 Id.  For an entertainment law case that was critical of a lawyer‘s skill, preparation and candor, see Love 
v. Mail on Sunday, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  The plaintiff, Mike Love, and the 
defendant, Brian Wilson, were members of the musical group, The Beach Boys.  Id. at 1053.  Love alleged 
that the defendants recorded and distributed a CD of Beach Boys songs to millions of people without 
Love‘s authorization.  Id.  The CD was distributed in the United Kingdom through the Sept. 4, 2004, 
edition of the newspaper, Mail on Sunday.  Id. at 1053-54.  Love sued for unfair competition under the 
Lanham Act ―based on the CD‘s use of the Beach Boys photos that included plaintiff‘s image, and on the 
use of the phrase ‘The Beach Boys‘ on the CD and related advertisements for the CD.‖  Id. at 1054.  The 
district court held that the Lanham Act did not apply because the allegedly infringing acts—the United 
Kingdom CD sales—occurred overseas and granted summary judgment for the defendants.  Id. at 1058.  
The court sanctioned Love‘s attorney $1,000 for misleading and deceiving the court and wasting time and 
resources.  Id. at 1059-60.  The court strongly admonished Love for his disingenuous claim of California 
residency and ―submitting a sloppily-assembled opposition brief.‖  Id. at 1059.  Love‘s counsel also 
submitted a consumer‘s Declaration that he had purchased a CD in the United States on eBay in hope of 
demonstrating that the CDs had reached the United States market.  Id.  The purchaser was not an innocent 
and independent consumer but rather someone who had been represented by or a co-plaintiff with Love‘s 
counsel.  Id.  The court stated that at a minimum, Love‘s counsel should have disclosed his relationship 
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representation depends on the complexity of the matter, the lawyer‘s experience both in 
general and with the particular matter, the preparation the lawyer is able to undertake, and 
the possibility of receiving assistance from another lawyer on staff who is already 
competent in the matter.
130
   
Competent handling of a matter starts with the initial client and case screening.  
The entertainment lawyer needs to realistically evaluate his or her knowledge and skill 
concerning the subject matter of the proposed representation.  The lawyer needs to 
determine whether he or she has sufficient experience to properly handle the matter.   
Another important question that the lawyer must consider is whether he or she has 
sufficient time to undertake representation.  Major litigation and complex issues generally 
demand more of a lawyer‘s time than simpler issues.131  If an otherwise-competent 
lawyer knows he or she cannot devote proper attention to a matter, the lawyer should not 
accept it.
132
  Model Rule 1.1 allows a lawyer to undertake representation if he or she can 
become competent through proper study.
133
  However, a lawyer should be wary of hastily 
undertaking representation in a matter that appears simple but falls outside his or her area 
of expertise or experience.
134
  The lawyer may not initially appreciate the amount of work 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the consumer.  Id.    The rift between Love and Wilson resulted in another reported decision.  See 
Love v. Mail on Sunday, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting summary judgment for the 
defendant, Brian Wilson, a member of the musical group the Beach Boys, and finding that he did not 
breach a fiduciary duty to another group member, Mike Love, based on an alleged partnership).  
130
 See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54-56.  See 
also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 3 (recommending that lawyers attend continuing legal education 
programs discussing developments in the entertainment field). 
131
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5. 
132
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 55.   
133
 The Code counterpart to Rule 1.1 is EC 6-3 (permitting a lawyer to undertake representation ―if in good 
faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation‖ and providing it does not result in 
undue delay or cost to the client).   
134
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 55.  See also 
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 187 (1986) (―Competence requires a fair modicum of 
knowledge and skill.  A lawyer must know at least the basic elements of the law involved in representing a 
client.‖) 
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necessary to provide competent representation and may quickly find the case to be 
unduly burdensome.
135
       
Lawyers should avoid the client who brings the lawyer a case in the ―eleventh 
hour.‖136  A lawyer who handles a case right before the statute of limitations expires risks 
having insufficient time to investigate the matter, increases the chance of overlooking 
claims or parties, and is more likely to miss the statute of limitations.
137
  All of these 
errors constitute grounds for an attorney-malpractice claim.  The attorney may ultimately 
pay for the client‘s procrastination.138   
Lawyers should not automatically agree to represent a client because they are a 
family member or a friend.
139
  These persons are just as apt as other clients to have 
unrealistic expectations about the lawyer‘s obligations, efforts, fees, and results.140   
Although it may seem counterintuitive, effective communication with a friend or family 
member may be more difficult because of the personal history of the parties.  Disgruntled 
clients who are friends or family members may even experience a special sense of 
disappointment or betrayal, which enhances the likelihood of the client filing a grievance 
or malpractice action against the lawyer.
141
 
                                                 
135
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 55. (―Yes, you 
can develop the expertise given sufficient time, but keep in mind that sufficient time will be far more than 
meets the eye at first glance and the client will not be willing to pay for your education.‖)  The ABA 
opposes ―dabbling‖ in complex areas of the law, and contends that ―there is no such thing as a simple will 
or a cut-and-dried personal injury case.‖  Id.     
136
 Id. 
137
 Id.  See WOLFRAM, supra note 134, 186-87.  
138
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 55.  See 
WOLFRAM, supra note 134, at 191-92. 
139
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 134, at 55. 
140
 Id.   
141
 Id.  
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Competency involves adequate research and investigation.  Almost half of all 
malpractice claims stem from substantive errors.
142
  For example, the lawyer may not 
know or correctly apply the law, or the lawyer may conduct insufficient discovery or 
investigation.
143
  The lawyer may not know the applicable deadlines or may make 
planning and procedural choice errors.
144
   
Lawyers may avoid these substantive errors by carefully and thoroughly 
researching the law, by reviewing the work of subordinate lawyers and staff, and by 
consulting experts in the field.
145
  Lawyers must keep abreast of legal developments in 
their field in hope of minimizing the risk of substantive error.
146
  A firm-wide written 
policy encouraging and funding Continuing Legal Education (CLE) offers lawyers the 
opportunity to learn of recent developments and to fine tune existing knowledge and 
skills.  Lawyers should also consider reviewing closed files and contacting clients when 
                                                 
142
 See id. at 56 (noting that in 1999 the ABA reported that 46 percent of all malpractice claims resulted 
from substantive errors). 
143
 Id.  For an entertainment law case involving allegations of improper investigation and due diligence, see 
Dimensional Music Publishing, LLC v. Kersey, 448 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  The plaintiff, 
Dimensional, a limited liability company engaged in music publishing, filed suit for a declaratory judgment 
to determine if it owned exclusively all the rights in the composition, ―Disco Inferno,‖ written by Tyrone 
Kersey and Leroy Green.  Id. at 646-47.  If Dimensional cannot be the owner, Dimensional alleges the 
result was a product of malpractice by Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (―Paul Weiss‖) in failing 
―to discover and report to plaintiff the risk that there was never a valid transfer of Kersey‘s renewal rights 
in the [c]ompositon.‖  Id. at  654.  Paul Weiss argued that it never represented the plaintiff but the court 
found ―there was at least a relationship of privity.‖  Id. at 655. 
144
 Id. See also WOLFRAM, supra note 134, at 185-88.   
145
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 56.  See also 
Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that consultations with ―more experienced entertainment lawyers 
are common and highly advisable.‖).  
146
 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER‘S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 56.  See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (stating that a ―lawyer should keep abreast of changes‖).  Cf. EC 
6-2 (noting that a lawyer maintains ―his competence by keeping abreast of current legal literature and 
developments, [and] participating in continuing legal education programs‖).  The competent practice of law 
also requires lawyers to remain aware of business developments in the industries in which they practice that 
might affect their ability to provide competent representation.  For example, lawyers in the music industry 
need to know about new business models, trends and deal points concerning the digital distribution music.  
See generally Robert Levine, Buying Music From Anywhere and Selling It for Play on the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at C1, C5 (noting how ―the economics of online stores is changing the financial 
calculations of the music business and making it profitable to sell a relatively small number of copies of a 
song,‖ and reporting about various digital music distribution deals).  
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recent developments may affect their interests.  For example, an estate planning lawyer 
may wish to contact a former client about tax code changes that affect the client‘s will or 
trust. 
   
F1.  COMPETENCY ISSUES AND TECHNOLOGY  
Lawyer competence today is increasingly dependent upon the understanding and use of 
technology.
147
  Technology facilitates greater and faster communication between lawyers 
and clients as well as with third parties, such as witnesses and court personnel.
148
  
Technology also facilitates efficient and comprehensive research, the negotiating and 
drafting of documents, the presentation of a client‘s case in a courtroom or other 
proceeding, and the storage and retrieval of information.
149
  These technological benefits 
                                                 
147
 See DAVID C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0 (LexisNexis 2009) (hereinafter THOMSON).  Understanding 
technology includes appreciating its impact on business models and deal points.  For example, in the 
publishing industry there is a question about who owns the digital rights to ―backlisted books‖—older 
publications—and how much the rights are worth.  See Motoko Rich, Plot Twist for Familiar Works: Who 
Owns the E-Book Rights? N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at 1.  Authors contend that it costs publishers much 
less to publish and release digital versions of works.  Id. at 31.  Accordingly, authors want more than the 
traditional digital royalty rate of 25 percent of net proceeds which is generally less than they ―typically 
receive on hardcover editions.‖  Id.  See generally A New Novel, Edited Down And Read in a Free Podcast 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009 (reporting on an industry first where a publisher, Hachette Audio, released for 
free on iTunes an abridged and serialized audio version of ―Transition‖ by Ian. M. Banks in hope of 
increasing full downloads ($19.95) and hardcover sales ($25.99)); Brain Stelter, Web-TV Divide Is Back in 
Focus With NBC Sale, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec. 4, 2009, at 1 (highlighting that online consumption of videos and 
television streams is soaring and that the television industry‘s business model is changing to restrict 
streaming; quoting Stephen B. Burke, the chief operating officer of Comcast, ‗―[streaming is] the biggest 
social movement I‘ve ever seen.‖‘).   
148
 The ease and speed of electronic communications may heighten concerns about ethical violations.  See 
Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009).  See also In the Nation, Facebook 
Limit for Judges, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 12, 2009, at A2 (reporting that the Florida Judicial Ethics 
Advisory Committee opined that lawyers and judges should no longer ―friend‖ each other because it might 
suggest ―that lawyers are in a position to influence their judge friends‖). 
149
 See THOMSON, supra note 147, at 46.  A 2006 ABA Survey found ―that the percentage of firms that had 
never e-filed a court document dropped precipitously from 70 percent to 40 percent‖ and that one study 
showed two-thirds of survey respondents started their research with online sources.  Id. at 48 (citing 
Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research Training: Preparing Student for a Rapidly Changing Environment, 
13 J. LEGAL WRITING 241, 247 (2007)).  
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play an important role in helping lawyers to meet their ethical obligation to provide 
competent representation.
150
  
 The inability to understand and to properly use technology may interfere with a 
lawyer‘s ability to provide competent representation.  For example, a litigator ―who 
produces electronic documents but [who] does not understand metadata is potentially 
committing malpractice.‖151   
Another common technology problem concerns the rapid pace and pervasiveness 
of electronic communication and its concomitant demands upon lawyers for immediate 
advice.
152
   It is easy for a lawyer to make a misstatement or offer questionable advice 
under the pressure of high paced communications.  In general, lawyers should resist 
knee-jerk replies to emails and instead carve out adequate time for reflection and the 
editing of replies.      
 Technology has also presented new hurdles to lawyer competency in the 
discovery process.  The ―expanding use of electronic communication and the relatively 
low cost of storing electronic information‖ has prompted one expert to write, ― ―[t]he 
discovery process today is . . . drowning in potential sources of information.‖153   
Lawyers play a key role in the discovery process by identifying, collecting, and 
reviewing information.  Lawyers, clients, and judges all have an interest in maximizing 
the quality of discovery which often means ―using automated tools to produce a reliable, 
                                                 
150
 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1.  These technological benefits also promote lawyer 
compliance with ethical precepts reflected in other rules.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
1.3 (addressing the lawyer‘s duty of diligence); R.1.4 (requiring lawyers to communicate with clients).  
151
 THOMSON, supra note 147, at 52. 
152
 See generally THOMSON, supra note 147, at vii –viii (reporting that ―[t]he Internet has achieved massive 
growth‖ and that ―[a] generation of students has grown up with the sophisticated and pervasive use of 
technology in nearly every facet of their lives.‖).  
153
 The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval 
Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 197 (2007) [hereinafter Sedona Conference].   
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reproducible and consistent product.‖154  Thus lawyers are well advised to consult with 
experts in the storage and retrieval of electronic communication in light of the potential 
for malpractice.
155
  In Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., lawyers were held responsible 
for failing to disclose e-mails and other documents that were detrimental to their case.
156
    
Lawyers may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and is 
relevant to a party‘s claim or defense subject to some limitations.157  Entertainment 
lawyers should inform clients as soon as possible about the potential large costs 
associated with the retrieval of information.
158
  ―[A] midsize case can generate up to 500 
gigabytes of potentially relevant data [which] could cost as much as $3.5 million to 
                                                 
154
  Id. at 199. 
155
 United States v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the categorization of computer-
related evidence is a relatively new question,‖ id. at 926, in a case where the defendant was charged, in 
part, with obstruction of justice for deleting emails pursuant to an ―email ‗retention‘ policy,‖ id. at 923).  
The court held that the FBI agent‘s testimony about forensic computer tests constituted expert testimony 
and not lay opinion.  Id. at 926-27.  
156
 No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated in part by No. 
05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).  See Paul Gupta, Dianna Szego & 
Jennifer Jacobs, Determining When the Duty to Preserve Arises and Managing Compliance with the Legal 
and Ethical E-Discovery Obligations, PLI ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008: WHAT CORPORATE 
AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW 225 (2008). 
157
 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering a defendant in a gender 
discrimination suit to produce all relevant e-mails including those deleted that were on back up disks; 
providing an excellent discussion of the ―proportionality test‖ under FRCP 26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii) for 
shifting the costs of production to the requesting party). 
158
 There are several reported cases involving the retrieval of electronic information and the entertainment 
industry.  See e.g., Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).  In Rowe, the plaintiffs were African American concert promoters who claimed that 
certain booking agencies and promoters had engaged in discriminatory and anti-competitive practices.  The 
plaintiffs made broad requests for e-mail correspondence.  The defendants claimed that producing these e-
mails was enormously expensive and they sought a protective order relieving them of the burden of 
production.  The court ruled that the defendants had to produce the e-mails even if it involved a huge 
expense because it was likely that they would reveal relevant information.  However, the court shifted the 
cost of production to the plaintiffs.  See also Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, No. CV-06-1093, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364 (C. D. Ca. May 29, 2007) and Columbia Pictures Industries v. Fung, No. 
CV-06-5578, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97576 (Cent. D. Ca. June 8, 2007).  Columbia pictures sued the 
owners of various websites for encouraging users to download copyrighted materials for free on their 
websites.  Columbia Pictures requested that the defendants in both cases preserve and produce electronic 
data, including the IP addresses of the website users.  The court held in both Bunnell and Fung that the 
preservation and production of this data was relevant and proper.   
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process and review . . . before production.‖159  Both the substantial cost and time 
involved in producing all relevant information in discovery has caused firms to outsource 
the production of information or to depend on their clients to produce the information.  
Although lawyers may outsource their work for e-discovery or have their clients search 
all relevant documents, lawyers are ultimately responsible for the production of all 
relevant information.
160
 
 
G. CONCLUSION  
Lawyers need to continually reassess how they practice law to ensure that their 
work conforms to good practice standards.
161
  This is especially true for entertainment 
lawyers who work in a highly competitive and rapidly changing business environment.
162
     
                                                 
159
 THOMSON, supra note 147, at 52. (―[T]he costs of storage have plummeted from $20,000 per gigabyte in 
1990 to less than $1 per gigabyte today.‖)  Sedona Conference, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. at 198 (citing Michelle 
Kessler, Days of Officially Drowning in Data Almost Upon Us, U.S. TODAY, Mar. 5, 2007).  
160
 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. No.08-451 (2008) (permitting ―a 
lawyer to outsource legal and nonlegal support services provided the lawyer remains ultimately responsible 
for providing competent legal services to the client under Model Rule 1.1.‖  A lawyer who outsources work 
must comply with Rules 5.1 and 5.3.  Thus, the outsourcing lawyer must undertake reasonable efforts to 
ensure that lawyers or nonlawyers who receive outsourced work act in accordance with the outsourcing 
lawyer‘s professional obligations.  Id.  A lawyer should inform his or her client about the outsourcing of 
work and obtain client consent when the lawyers or nonlawyers performing outsourced work receive 
information protected by Rule 1.6.  Id.  See Eileen Libby, A Qualified Yes, 94 ABA J. 32 (Nov. 2008). 
161
 Abdo & Sahl, supra note 2, at 3 (recommending that entertainment lawyers conduct professional 
responsibility audits of their practices to ensure that they are complying with state ethical codes and noting 
that records of such audits may be ―useful evidence of the lawyer‘s efforts to comply with ethical standards 
if the lawyer becomes the subject of a grievance or a malpractice action‖).  The ABA is also engaged in a 
major reassessment of existing rules of lawyer conduct because of the increasing globalization of the 
practice of law and ―rapid advances in technology.‖  Joan C. Rogers, Agenda for Ethics 20/20 Project 
Examines Impact of Technology, Disappearing Borders, 25, NO. 25 ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 694 (Dec. 9, 2009).  See also Pamela Atkins, ABA Launches New Initiative to 
Revamp Lawyer Ethics Rules, 25, NO. 16 ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 418 
(Aug. 5, 2009) (reporting about the creation of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 and its task of taking 
a ―fresh look at legal ethics and the regulation of the profession‖).  
162
 Tim Arango, G E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go To Comcast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009 at B3 
(recognizing that G.E.‘s acquisition of NBC ―reshapes the entertainment industry, giving a cable provider a 
huge portfolio of new content, even as it raises the sector‘s anxieties about the future‖); Jeffrey R. Young, 
Music Industry Changes Tune of New Program to Fight File Sharing, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 
2009, at A12 (reporting about Choruss, an new experimental service led by Warner Music Group, that 
would allow students at six undisclosed colleges to pay a blanket license fee, ―similar to what radio stations 
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Lawyers must be flexible in adapting to this ever-changing business landscape, but they 
must also be resolute in their commitment to good practice standards.
163
  The standards 
discussed in this article will hopefully protect entertainment lawyers from being the target 
of disciplinary and legal malpractice actions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
pay to air popular songs,‖ to download music ―to their own computers with no restrictions‖); Brooks 
Barnes, After Mickey’s Makeover, Look for a Little Less Mr. Nice Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009 at A1 
(discussing how Disney is ―re-imaging‖ Mickey Mouse to induce ―new generations of tech-savy children to 
embrace him‖ id. at 4 ); Brooks Barnes & Michael Cieply, Disney Swoops Into Action Buying Marvel For 
$4 Billion Sept. 1, 2009 (describing Disney‘s acquisition and it possibly ―herald[ing]a new wave of media 
consolidation‖ id. at 7); Jenna Wortham, iPhone Games Give Music Artists New Spotlight, AKRON BEACON 
J., Dec. 26, 2008, at C8 (describing how a simple game for iPhone has become ―an Internet-age mobile 
stage for musicians‖; reporting that in October 2008 that players of Tap Tap Revenge—an iPhone game—
bought 50,000 copies of the featured track Hot n Cold by Katy Perry).  ―The gravy train of the old days of 
having CD sales buffer you as an artist are gone‖ as artists ―tr[y] to be in more than one place at once.‖  Id. 
at C9. 
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 See AGENDA FOR ETHICS 20/20, supra note 161, at 696 (stating that ―the ultimate goal is ‗to help the 
legal profession respond to the opportunities and challenges‘ that advances in technology have created 
while preserving the core values of the profession‖ (quoting, in part, Ethics 20/20 Commission Co-chair 
Michael Traynor)). 
